Sadiku: Unmasking terrorist leader behind Kwara massacre
Findings shows that the attack was the result of a calculated expansion of a jihadist front that the country’s security architecture failed to halt despite prior warnings.
At the centre of the bloodshed is Abubakar Saidu, popularly known as Sadiku, a terrorist commander whose violent trail spans more than a decade and northern region of the country.
For years, Sadiku remained a shadowy figure within the insurgency landscape.
But investigations reveal a 12-year evolution that saw him rise from a handpicked lieutenant of the late Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2014, to what security analysts now describe as the “Shekau of the North-Central” by 2026.
As sustained military pressure weakened Boko Haram’s strongholds in the North-East, Sadiku migrated westward, embedding himself in the vast forest corridors of Niger and Kwara states.
From there, he orchestrated a campaign that crippled farming communities, displaced families, and ultimately culminated in one of the deadliest mass killings recorded in Kwara State.
From Shekau’s lieutenant to ruthless kingpin
Security findings indicate that Sadiku was originally deployed by Boko Haram to Niger State as a trusted operative tasked with expanding the group’s influence beyond its traditional North-East base.
A self-styled counterterrorism analyst on X, MobilisingNigeria, traced Sadiku’s ascent within the insurgency to his close ties with the late Shekau, who personally selected him to represent Boko Haram’s interests in Niger State.
“He later worked with Dogo Gide to expand into the North-Central terrain and also collaborated with the Darul Islam terrorist group before the police dismantled it,” the analyst wrote.
For a period, Sadiku maintained an alliance with notorious bandit kingpin Gide, leveraging the partnership to acquire weapons, intelligence, and local influence.
However, ideological disagreements eventually fractured the alliance, leading to violent clashes that claimed fighters on both sides.
Following the split, Sadiku retreated deeper into the forests, eventually establishing a base within the Kainji Forest Reserve in July 2025.
Observers note that this marked a turning point in his operations, as he abandoned transactional banditry for a more rigid, ideologically driven campaign of terror.
Kainji Forest: The ‘new Sambisa’
Stretching across Niger and Kwara states, the Kainji Forest Reserve has emerged as a strategic hub linking insurgents from the North-East with remnants of bandit groups in the North-West.
Security experts describe the forest as Nigeria’s “new Sambisa,” offering cover for recruitment, weapons movement, and coordinated attacks on rural communities across Niger, Kwara, Kebbi, and parts of Kaduna states.
A Kwara-based security expert, who identified himself as Hassan, confirmed that Sadiku’s relocation to the Kainji corridor signalled a dangerous expansion of Boko Haram-style insurgency into the North-Central region.
“For over a decade, Boko Haram violence was largely concentrated in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.”
“But splinter factions and allied groups are now exploiting forests, weak security presence and porous borders to push westward,” he said.
Who is Sadiku?
In a separate post on X, MobilisingNigeria described Sadiku as a factional leader of Boko Haram who relocated from the North-East to establish new bases in the North-West and North-Central regions.
“Sadiku is equated to Shekau. Military pressure in the North-East forced him to move toward the North-West and North-Central as new bases,” the analyst wrote.
A West and East Africa security tracker, Brandon Phillips, also linked Sadiku’s faction directly to the Woro massacre.
Phillips revealed that the attack occurred less than four kilometres from Nuku, where fighters of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, an Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel, claimed their first-ever attack in Nigeria in October 2025.
According to him, the proximity suggests an operational overlap between JNIM and the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction, pointing to either an opportunistic alliance or a non-aggression pact.
Phillips further noted that the Woro massacre followed a similar pattern to recent attacks in the Papiri area of Niger State, indicating a continued southward push by Sadiku’s faction toward areas of the Kainji Reserve dominated by JNIM.
In another post dated January 11, he disclosed that operational links between JNIM and the Sadiku-led Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad faction became increasingly evident between November and December 2025.
During that period, Sadiku reportedly redeployed most of his fighters into JNIM-controlled areas of Kwara, Niger and southern Kebbi states.
Phillips also linked JNIM to the Papiri kidnapping of Catholic children, noting that some abductees were held in a JNIM camp following an operation carried out by Sadiku’s faction.
“These attacks have occurred within established JNIM operational zones, suggesting continued cooperation between the two groups,” he wrote.
Another security researcher, Raheem Mutiu, corroborated these findings, noting that JNIM fighters were spreading across Kaiama, Baruten, Borgu and surrounding areas near the Kainji Forest Reserve.
He added that these territories were initially controlled by the Mahmuda group, whose influence waned sharply after the arrest of its leader in August 2025.
African conflict researcher James Barnett observed that the brutality of the Woro massacre distinguished Sadiku’s group from the Mahmudawa faction, which previously focused on preaching and social issues, with violence largely occurring in response to military operations.
Following the arrest of the Mahmuda leader, Barnett said some fighters joined Sadiku’s faction, while others fled to Benin Republic, consolidating Boko Haram splinter control around the Kainji axis.
The warning letter, the execution
Findings revealed that the Woro community was warned weeks before the attack.
The village head, Salihu Umar, confirmed that a letter written in Hausa and dated 19 Rajab 1447 (January 8) was delivered to him about three weeks before the massacre.
The letter, signed by JAS, stated that the group wished to “secretly” meet with community leaders to preach and would not harm residents.
Umar said he photocopied the letter and submitted it to the Kaiama Emirate, while also forwarding a soft copy to the Department of State Services office in Kaiama.
On the day of the attack, eyewitnesses indicate that the gunmen arrived in Woro around 5pm on motorcycles, armed with AK-47 rifles and explosives.
They surrounded the community, blocking all exit routes.
At about 6pm, the attackers stormed the Emir’s palace, dragged out his family and set the building ablaze. At the same time, sporadic gunfire rang across the town.
Residents reported seeing a white helicopter with markings hovering over the area briefly, but it departed without intervention.
Between 6.30pm and 8pm, the attackers entered what survivors described as an “execution phase,” rounding up men, binding their hands behind their backs, and killing them.
A military aircraft reportedly returned around 8pm, forcing the attackers into nearby bushes. Believing the danger had passed, some residents emerged from hiding around 9pm.
The assailants regrouped, using the call to prayer as a ruse to lure people out before resuming the killings.
The violence subsided around 2am, as the terrorists retreated into the forest with abducted women and children.
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